US Navy quietly kills HALO hypersonic missile initiative, the latest failure to match China’s growing arsenal of the weapon
The US Navy has killed its next-generation hypersonic missile, slamming the brakes on a once-promising development program amid soaring costs, shaky performance and China’s growing arsenal.
This month, Naval News reported that the US Navy has terminated its Hypersonic Air-Launched Offensive (HALO) missile initiative, originally part of the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment 2 (OASuW Inc 2) program, citing insurmountable budgetary issues and underperformance.
Rear Admiral Stephen Tedford, the US Navy’s program executive officer for unmanned aviation and strike weapons, confirmed the cancellation occurred in the autumn of 2024 after a fiscal analysis deemed the system financially and operationally unviable.
HALO was slated for “early operational capability” (EOC) by FY29 and “initial operational capability” by FY31, intending to counter high-value surface targets from standoff distances.
Instead, Lockheed Martin’s Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), a component of OASuW Increment 1, will undergo significant hardware and software upgrades to bolster precision and effectiveness.
Tedford underscored the US Navy’s commitment to long-range weapons, prioritizing existing systems to align with national defense objectives. Industry insiders, including Northrop Grumman executives, signaled HALO’s challenges during the Sea Air Space 2025 expo, with feasibility and cost concerns dominating discussions.
The decision to abandon the HALO program reflects broader fiscal and strategic recalibrations within America’s munitions industrial base and highlights the challenges in developing exotic, high-cost systems amid tightening defense budgets. It may also highlight the US military’s incapacity for rapid, high-speed, precision strikes against heavily defended naval targets.
In a March 2025 Atlantic Council report, Michael White highlights that capability, stating that a subsonic missile such as Tomahawk or the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) would take one hour to reach a target 800 kilometers away, while a hypersonic cruise missile can hit the target in less than 10 minutes.
White also mentions that a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) can make the trip between Guam and the Taiwan Strait in under 30 minutes.
However, Asia Times has pointed out that stealthy anti-ship missiles such as LRASM offer distinct advantages over hypersonic weapons by combining low radar cross-sections and minimal infrared signatures with advanced semi-autonomous guidance systems.
These features ensure survivability and precision in heavily contested electromagnetic warfare (EW) environments, where reliance on external intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms might be compromised.
The LRASM’s stealth attributes make it harder to detect and intercept. In contrast, hypersonic weapons can create detectable plasma wakes and light emissions.
The capability to share data and execute coordinated swarm attacks further enhances LRASM’s effectiveness. Its stealth and autonomous targeting capabilities offer effective tactical solutions, offsetting some lost advantages from HALO’s cancellation.
Yet, at the operational level, HALO’s cancellation risks creating a capability gap to defeat anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies. A January 2023 report by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) mentions that hypersonic weapons, launched beyond the reach of A2/AD systems with their atmospheric flight profile, enable them to evade midcourse missile defenses designed to intercept targets in space.
According to the report, by flying lower and maneuvering unpredictably, hypersonic missiles complicate detection and interception by ship-based and short-range defenses, potentially neutralizing coastal air defenses, over-the-horizon (OTH) radars and strike systems early in a conflict.
However, despite those advantages, a weak US hypersonic weapons industrial base may preclude the widespread adoption of such weapons.
A report released this month by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) mentions that the US Department of Defense (DOD) has not yet established programs of record, indicating a lack of approved mission requirements or long-term acquisition plans for hypersonic weapons. It also points out that the US testing infrastructure remains limited, with no current US facility able to simulate full-scale, time-dependent flight environments above Mach 8.
Additionally, it says flight test schedules are continually hampered by limited hypersonic flight corridors, insufficient test ranges and limited support assets, hindering efforts to transition hypersonic prototypes into deployable weapons systems.
In contrast, the LRASM may have a more mature production base. In an April 2023 article for Air & Space Forces Magazine, Chris Gordon mentions that Lockheed Martin is producing more than 500 LRASMs and JASSMs a year, with the defense contractor working to increase capacity to 1,000 missiles annually.
In the same article, Dom DeScisciolo mentions that the LRASM and JASSM share many components and are built on the same production lines. DeScisciolo notes the missiles are designated as either type depending on customer demand.
Strategically, canceling HALO undermines the US Navy’s efforts to maintain technological parity or superiority with competitors like China and Russia, which are aggressively advancing hypersonic missile programs.
Russia has already used hypersonic weapons in combat against Ukraine, though their effectiveness and overall impact on the ongoing war of attrition between the two are debatable.
Similarly, China fielded the DF-17 HGV missile system in 2019 and tested an HGV that reportedly circled the globe before cruising to its target in August 2021. In contrast, despite intensive testing, the US has yet to field any hypersonic weapon.
In a March 2024 statement for the US House Armed Services Committee, Jeffrey McCormick mentions that China now has the world’s leading hypersonic arsenal, underscoring China’s advances in hypersonic weapon technology.
McCormick says two decades of intense and focused investment, development, testing and deployment have dramatically advanced China’s development of conventional and nuclear-armed hypersonic missile technologies.
However, some argue hypersonic weapons are overhyped and no better than existing weapons. In a March 2024 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, David Wright and Cameron Tracy argue that existing weapons, such as ballistic missiles, already fly at hypersonic speed and that drag from low-altitude atmospheric flight could slow hypersonic weapons down more than ballistic missiles on a depressed trajectory.
Wright and Tracy mention that hypersonic weapons emit substantial heat signatures during launch and flight, which could be detected early by satellites and other ground-based sensors, enabling potential interception.
They also say hypersonic weapons have limited maneuverability, as immense force is required to change direction at such speeds and scramjet engine technology for that purpose is still immature.
In terms of accuracy, they point out that the same guidance systems in hypersonic weapons can be used in maneuvering missile warheads (MARVs) and that the latter fly high enough to avoid the in-flight heating problems associated with the former.
In line with those views, Wright and Tracy say that while the US can not yet build functional hypersonic weapons, it stands to question whether those weapons make military and fiscal sense, regardless of whether its near-peer adversaries build them.
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