The cost of the reduced Collins-class submarine Life-Of-Type Extension (LOTE) Program is estimated at around $11 billion in Australian dollars, double the estimate for the full LOTE. This is likely due not only to the previous costs being greatly underestimated, but also to the increasing cost of maintaining old equipment on the submarines.
This raises the question of value for money. Even if all goes according to the new plan, Australia will pay around $1.8 billion per submarine to keep its conventional submarine capability at roughly its current level, at best. In all aspects of capability, this does not compare favourably with new, modern conventional submarines.
For example, Japan’s Taigei-class submarines cost about $600 million to $700 million each. Taigei-class submarines are capable of firing type 18 heavy torpedoes, harpoon anti-ship missiles, type 12 long-range anti-ship missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles.
What exactly is the point of the Royal Australian Navy extending the life of the Collins-class using $1.8 billion of taxpayers’ money instead of buying Taigei-class submarines?
The government’s decision to cut back the scope of the work also increases the risk to Australia’s possession of a modern, crewed submarine capability in the next decade.
Canberra should approach Tokyo to explore buying or leasing Japanese submarines, should they be required in the 2030s.
AUKUS remains the best partnership for Australia to acquire the nuclear-powered submarines necessary to manage the most dangerous era since World War II. But the now elevated risk of losing adequate conventional submarine capability in the meantime strengthens the case for preparing a Japanese fallback option.
The Collins-class LOTE program, as originally planned, was always highly risky, so cutting back what will be done to the six submarines to keep them going is an understandable and responsible move.
This could mean the rapid retirement of older Collins-class vessels and even the decision not to extend the lives of some units, leaving a smaller and rapidly ageing submarine force until the arrival of nuclear boats.
The reduction in planned submarine capability as a result of the de-scoped LOTE program increases the importance of achieving the remaining two key steps of the AUKUS Optimal Pathway, delivery to the Royal Australian Navy of US Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) and local construction of the follow-on Anglo-Australian SSN-AUKUS class.
The Virginias are due to arrive in the early 2030s, almost certainly not before 2032. But there is a significant risk that deliveries could be delayed – or even withheld if the US judges that it has too few SSNs for its own requirements. Since the Collins class is losing its competitiveness with age, delays to the Virginias and SSN-AUKUS could leave Australia without a modern crewed submarine capability for a decade or more – hence the need to get ready now for the Japanese fallback option.
© 2026, GDC. © GDC and www.globaldefensecorp.com. Unauthorized use and/or duplication of this material without express and written permission from this site’s author and/or owner is strictly prohibited. Excerpts and links may be used, provided that full and clear credit is given to www.globaldefensecorp.com with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.
