Threat detection, tracking and Targeting solution are the first steps in Missile Defence. This is a big problem for any land-based ballistic missile defence system operating in an urban environment, not to mention for countries without flat terrain and with lots of clutter. It doesn’t matter how good interceptor missiles are if a crappy radar system serves as the fire-control and illumination radar.
While the air defence system’s failure could indicate flaws and shortcomings, it is also possible that the combined airpower of the US and Israel has just overwhelmed S-400 backed infrastructure, which was put together hurriedly after hostilities in the Gulf began.
Analysts now suggest two broad explanations for its apparent shortcomings in Iran: technical constraints such as radar coverage, reaction time and interceptor inventory, or operational overwhelm.
The combined US–Israeli campaign reportedly involved stealth aircraft, electronic warfare, precision-guided munitions and cyber operations. If early strikes degraded radar and command nodes, even advanced systems could struggle.
What is the S-400 missile system?
The S-400 missile system integrates a fire control radar, illumination radar, VHF radar, interceptor missile, launchers, and command and control centre. The S-400 SAM system has four missile variants: 40N6 missile (400 km), 48N6 missile (250 kilometers), 9M96E2 missile (120km) and 9M96E missile (40 km).
S-400 radar system
Based on the customer’s order, the S-400 system includes the Gamma-C1E SHF, Nebo-M VHF, and the Resonance-NE mobile radar station for early-warning and high-altitude radar coverage. The Russian propagandists claim that these are AESA radar, but these high-frequency antennas were manufactured in the early 2000s. There is nothing solid-state electronics about Russia’s defence industries that would produce AESA radar. Visit www.globaldefensecorp.com for an in-depth article about ‘Why Russia cannot manufacture AESA radar?’.
S-400 inceptor missiles
The S-400’s large 92N6E X-band radar has trouble tracking an incoming missile. How well would the tiny seeker-head on 48N6E3 and 40N6 SAMs face? The most common type of missile, the 48N6E series, doesn’t even have active guidance and continue to rely on semi-active radar homing, which puts them at a distinct disadvantage against a ballistic missile (or Hypersonic target) compared to the likes of Patriot’s interceptor with active-guidance and a dual-mode seeker (combining active-homing with ground-based target illumination). None of the S-400’s missiles are known to have dual-mode seekers.
This Patriot’s missile has far greater manoeuvrability resulting in much better accuracy and greater acceleration, a fact also highlighted by 48N6E3 carrying three times bigger warhead to compensate for its poor accuracy (180 kg versus 73 kg).
All long-range missiles of S-400 (48N6E & 40N6) suffer from the exact problem. A large warhead will not compensate for a missile detonating at significantly longer distances from a ballistic missile (poor accuracy) since the size of the shrapnel cloud doesn’t work well against an incoming ballistic target hardened to withstand re-entry into the atmosphere. It just makes reliably intercepting ballistic missiles far more complex.
Almaz-Antey’s original brochure of S-400’s 92N6E radar has 185 km tracking range against a 0.4 square meters RCS ballistic target and 340 km for aircraft. That gives an S-400 battery about 65 seconds to engage a Mach 8 class ballistic missile. Claiming S-400 can engage targets at 400 km is entirely misleading and Russian propaganda.
The caveat here is that 0.4 square meters RCS used by the manufacturer is an unrealistic RCS for ballistic targets or cruise missiles whose RCS ranges between 0.1 to 0.01 square meters RCS depending on the type. This suddenly changes as the 92N6E radar’s range decreases to 180 km and 73 km, respectively.
So now the S-400 system has between 46 seconds to 25 seconds to engage a short-range ballistic missile and cruise missiles, which, to put it, isn’t great at all.
The S-400’s real-world tracking range doesn’t quite match the brochure figure, as demonstrated in Ukraine, where the S-400 was unable to track Mach 2.5 HIMARS rockets despite having more than 90 seconds of engagement window on paper. If it has so much trouble handling Mach 2.5 HIMARS rockets, which can be detected from boost-phase, how well do you think S-400 would fare against much faster ballistic targets with roughly similar RCS?
The S-400 can only integrate with Pantsir short-range anti-air missiles. Pantsir’s questionable anti-air missile failed in Syria, Libya, Armenia and Ukraine wars. The S-400 missile’s 180 kg blast fragmentation warhead compensates for inaccurate interceptor missiles. Still, if the radar does not provide accurate targets, and interceptor missiles do not independently and accurately home on the target, then the S-400 interceptor will fail.
Russia may have launched multiple interceptor missiles at Storm Shadow. However, Storm Shadow is a stealth cruise missile with a small RCS, travelling at Mach .95; Russia’s S-400 radar does not detect a low-altitude stealth object flying towards the target. Hence, all missiles will fail regardless of how many S-400 interceptor missiles are launched.
No amount of Russian propaganda can compensate for real-world scenarios and actual combat performance.
Russian and Chinese manufacturers will never face scrutiny at home, no senate hearings for any failures, and no public backlash over their system failures in the hands of export customers.
Russian and Chinese military themselves are inept in operational planning and setting combat requirements for the product, and adhere to those requirements and demand that the manufacturer exactly meet those requirements, rather than corruption and grease payment to high-ranking military officers and corrupt politicians to silence the actual product datasheet, resulting in total loss in combat.
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