Reports indicate that China is sending private security contractors to Myanmar to protect Chinese investments, particularly those related to the Belt and Road Initiative, and personnel amidst the ongoing civil conflict. This development follows the Myanmar military regime’s enactment of a law enabling foreign private security companies to operate within the country.
In August, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar for his first meeting with Myanmar’s junta leader, Min Aung Hlaing, since the February 2021 military coup plunged the country into civil war.
Then, last month, Min Aung Hlaing reciprocated with his first visit to China as head of the junta.
Reports in recent weeks have also indicated the Chinese government and Myanmar’s military junta are establishing a joint security company to protect Chinese projects and personnel from the civil war. This development is extremely concerning and does not bode well for any of the players involved.
The move comes after a string of significant military victories by the opposition, including the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s successful Operation 1027 over the past year. These rebel groups captured large swathes of territory near the China-Myanmar border, at least initially with China’s tacit support.
Chinese PMC registered in Cambodia
Other countries in mainland Southeast Asia are also using private security for infrastructure protection. Informed stakeholders report that Chinese nationals manage many licensed foreign PMSCs in Cambodia through a combination of methods, including direct management, joint ventures, and the use of Cambodian registration or identities, especially in Sihanoukville’s economic zones. In Laos, similar firms protect Chinese investment corridors along the China–Laos railway and in the Golden Triangle region. These deployments often operate under informal arrangements, with little public reporting or national oversight.
While much is still unclear about the deployment of these private Chinese security guards in Myanmar, one thing is certain: China has decided to unequivocally back the junta after years of hedging its bets.
The primary motivation is to safeguard Chinese infrastructure projects and personnel from escalating violence and instability in Myanmar.
The decline of the Myanmar military’s capacity to maintain security has made Chinese assets more vulnerable, prompting Beijing to seek alternative means of protection.
The new law in Myanmar provides a legal basis for the deployment of Chinese private security contractors. China is seeking to protect its interests without direct military intervention, which could have wider geopolitical implications.
The presence of foreign security contractors could be seen as an escalation of the conflict and further complicate the situation.
There are concerns that the increased presence of Chinese security personnel could exacerbate anti-Chinese sentiment within Myanmar. There is a risk of clashes between these private security forces and various armed groups in Myanmar.
Some reports suggest that Chinese private security companies may lack the experience and capabilities of Western counterparts in handling complex conflict situations. There are concerns that these security companies may not adequately address the social and environmental impacts of Chinese projects, potentially leading to further conflict.
Myanmar stands out in this regional landscape. Unlike its neighbors, it has created a legal category for foreign PMSCs, though implementation remains narrow and opaque. The Myanmar model appears closer to Cambodia and Laos, where informal arrangements dominate and enforcement is uneven. However, Myanmar’s case is more politically sensitive due to ongoing conflict and international scrutiny. The 2024 law reflects both an effort to formalize foreign protection for key infrastructure and a strategic move to outsource risk in contested zones.
Implications for China in Myanmar
For China, the use of PMSCs reinforces its diplomatic posture, particularly in Myanmar. Beijing engages with both the military and several ethnic armed groups in Myanmar and has recently played a mediating role in northern Myanmar ceasefires, where key trade routes intersect with the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor and Lancang–Mekong Cooperation zones.
China believes its ability to maintain project operations through private security in conflict-affected areas, where infrastructure is vulnerable and authority is fragmented, strengthens its position as a conflict mediator. By avoiding direct military involvement and demonstrating a focus on continuity and asset protection rather than political alignment, Beijing seeks to present itself as a pragmatic development partner and a neutral interlocutor.
This posture is becoming contested. While PMSCs may enhance operational continuity and suggest reliability to state actors, ethnic armed organizations and segments of the public in Myanmar increasingly have interpreted China’s moves as signs of partiality, particularly following Beijing’s overt support for the State Administration Council after August 2023. These perceptions have undermined China’s neutrality in the eyes of some local stakeholders, weakening its credibility as an impartial mediator.
Problems for Bangladesh, India, and Thailand
Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines have adopted more restrictive approaches, with foreign PMSCs are banned or limited to indirect roles. Even so, investors often turn to local security firms or advisory consultants to ensure project access and continuity.
In Thailand and Vietnam, security provision remains firmly under state control, with limited space for foreign-linked entities to operate independently. The preference is to license domestic firms with ties to the police or military, ensuring tighter political oversight. In the Philippines, legal ambiguity persists, but most foreign clients rely on partnerships with local firms that operate under civilian permits or through advisory channels.
Chances are very high that Bangladeshi, Indian and Thai nationals will be offered money to fight for Myanmar’s junta, as Russia has recruited Indian and Nepalese. China will also assist Myanmar to gain territories near Bangladesh, and the poorly trained Bangladesh army and its ill-equipped security forces will be unable to defend their territory.
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