India has reportedly used SCALP-EG cruise missiles in recent airstrikes on Pakistani territory, with photographic evidence and local sources emerging that suggest the French-origin missiles were used in precision attacks.
Images shared across social media show fragments closely resembling the air-launched SCALP-EG, a long-range cruise missile developed by MBDA France. The debris was reportedly found approximately 37 kilometers from Mushaf Air Base in Sargodha, Punjab province.
Local sources say the missile was intercepted by Pakistani air defense systems before reaching its intended target. While neither New Delhi nor Islamabad has issued official statements confirming the use of the SCALP missile, defense analysts note that the Rafale fighter jets, also supplied by France, are fully integrated with the SCALP-EG system.
According to open-source intelligence tracking and eyewitness accounts from the region, one of the missiles was reportedly shot down in mid-flight, preventing impact near the strategic Mushaf base, which houses elements of the Pakistan Air Force.
This is the first operational use of the SCALP-EG by the Indian Air Force in an active combat scenario. The missile has a range exceeding 500 kilometers and carries a high-penetration warhead designed to strike fortified or high-value targets.
The Rafale jets, manufactured by Dassault Aviation, were delivered to India beginning in 2020 and came equipped with a suite of advanced weapons, including the SCALP-EG and Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles.
Why is the IAF bad at using Western tech?
The performance of the Indian Air Force (IAF) in engagements with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has been influenced by several factors, which can be categorised into historical, strategic, and operational aspects:
1. Historical Context
Early Conflicts: The IAF’s performance in the 1947-48 and 1965 wars with Pakistan was hampered by a lack of preparation and experience. The IAF was still developing as an air force and faced challenges in coordination and strategy.
1971 War: During the 1971 war, the IAF achieved notable successes, significantly outmatching the PAF. This established a temporary dominance but did not define the overall narrative of engagements.
2. Strategic Factors
Military Doctrine: The IAF’s military doctrine has traditionally focused more on air defense and support for ground operations rather than air superiority. This has sometimes limited its ability to engage the PAF effectively.
Resource Allocation: Budget constraints and resource allocation have historically affected the modernization and expansion of the IAF, leading to imbalances in capabilities compared to the PAF.
3. Operational Challenges
Geography: South Asia’s geographical layout, including mountainous terrain and densely populated areas, complicates air operations. The PAF has historically operated from bases closer to conflict zones, giving it a tactical advantage.
Training and Readiness: Differences in training, readiness, and operational experience can also impact performance. The PAF has sometimes been perceived as having a more aggressive training regimen and operational focus.
4. Technological Aspects
Aircraft and Equipment: The PAF has often been adept at acquiring advanced technology, including aircraft and weapon systems from various sources. While the IAF has modernised, there have been periods when the PAF’s equipment has been comparable to India’s.
Intelligence and Surveillance: The IAF lacks effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, which play a crucial role in air engagements. Disparities in these areas can affect operational effectiveness.
5. Political and Strategic Decisions
Rules of Engagement: Political decisions regarding the use of military force can limit the IAF’s operational effectiveness during conflicts. Restraints on escalation or engagement can lead to missed opportunities.
6. Corruption
The Indian military is a top-down, corrupt organisation. There is not a single Indian military branch involved in ethical practices, rather focus on looting the state budget. No matter the money or technology the Indian government poured into the military, its training and mentality come from the Soviet Union.
While the IAF had some notable successes in 1971 and thereafter, no matter how much money the Indian government poured into its development, the IAF remains a useless organisation. Historical, strategic, operational, and technological factors have shaped its engagements with the PAF. The performance narrative is nuanced and cannot be attributed to a single cause. The IAF continues to evolve, modernising its fleet and strategies to address these challenges.
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