US Navy’s EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft blinded Chinese and Russian-made radars in Venezuela.

An EA-18G Growler from the "Patriots" of Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 140 and an E-2D Hawkeye assigned to the "Bluetails" of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron (VAW) 121 fly over the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) during an Independence Day air power demonstration.

United States forces used Navy EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft during the January 3 strike on Venezuela, employing high-power jamming to disable multiple layers of the country’s air-defense network.

The EA-18G Growler’s midband jammer is the Raytheon AN/ALQ-249 Next Generation Jammer-Mid Band (NGJ-MB), a cutting-edge electronic warfare pod replacing older systems, providing advanced, software-defined jamming for radars and communications in the 2-6 GHz spectrum, using AESA antennas for focused beams, and enhancing electronic attack by disrupting enemy kill chains with simultaneous multiple-target jamming. It’s a key component of the Growler’s mission to control the electromagnetic spectrum, enabling forces to operate more safely.

The action was first acknowledged through statements from Venezuelan military personnel who reported that radar systems “were blinded” minutes before precision weapons struck their sites.

According to accounts shared by Venezuelan operators, the attack unfolded rapidly, with radar crews claiming that moments before the strikes “all the monitors of the radar were in interference, and it looked as if someone had thrown a handful of sand at the screen.” They said the system “became useless” as the incoming U.S. operation began.

The operation involved the U.S. Navy’s carrier-based EA-18G Growler, a specialized electronic attack aircraft equipped to suppress radar, disrupt communications networks and support strike aircraft by degrading enemy situational awareness. The Growler is widely used across the U.S. Navy for electronic attack missions, including jamming of early-warning radars and air-defense engagement systems.

Venezuelan forces had long promoted their air-defense network as one of the most advanced in Latin America. The country fielded Russian-supplied Buk-M2E surface-to-air missile systems and Chinese-made JY-27 long-range radars marketed as capable of detecting low-observable F-35 aircraft. Venezuela reportedly received between nine and twelve JY-27 and JYL-1 systems, and twelve Buk-M2E batteries were delivered earlier in the 2010s.

Chinese-made radars in Venezuela

Imagery released after the strike showed destroyed radar positions and damaged components of the Buk-M2E system, including two launchers and a command post. Venezuelan military representatives claimed the attack was “unexpectedly fast,” and several radar crews stated they were unable to track approaching aircraft or incoming weapons once jamming began.

Destroyed Buk-M2E system

The Growler’s electronic attack suite is designed to suppress multi-channel air-defense systems by transmitting complex jamming patterns that disrupt radar tracking, engagement radars, and communications between command elements. This support allows strike aircraft to reach defended areas without entering engagement envelopes of modern surface-to-air missile systems.

Following the operation, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth commented publicly, saying: “Seems those Russian air defenses didn’t quite work so well, did they?”

The remark referenced longstanding claims by Moscow and Caracas about the performance and survivability of their air-defense equipment.

The EA-18G’s role in the operation underscores the U.S. Navy’s emphasis on electronic attack as a core component of strike missions against defended targets. The aircraft carries advanced receivers, jamming pods and communications disruption equipment intended to neutralize complex air-defense networks at the outset of an air campaign.

The January 3 attack highlights the current state of U.S. electronic-warfare capabilities and the challenges faced by conventional radar systems when exposed to modern jamming. It also illustrates the importance of electronic-attack platforms in enabling precision strikes against hardened or well-defended infrastructure.

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