The ongoing war in Ukraine has exposed the severe shortcomings of Soviet-designed infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), particularly the BMP-2 and BMP-3.
Russian forces have been forced to implement makeshift modifications to compensate for these flaws, attempting to increase their chances of survival in combat.
Recently, images have surfaced showing upgraded BMP-2 vehicles with large external troop compartments mounted atop the vehicle’s hull. These modifications stem from the inherent discomfort and cramped conditions inside the standard troop compartment, forcing soldiers to build larger structures with wider doors for easier dismounting.
This practice is reminiscent of tactics dating back to the Soviet-Afghan War, when troops commonly rode on top of armored vehicles. Sitting atop the vehicle is believed to increase soldiers’ chances of survival in the event of an RPG strike or an anti-tank mine explosion, as it prevents soldiers from being trapped inside a burning or destroyed vehicle.
Due to the vulnerability of BMP-2 vehicles, Russian soldiers often opt to ride on the roof rather than inside. This adaptation is an attempt to mitigate the risk of casualties caused by the vehicle’s poor protection against mines and anti-tank weapons.
In direct battlefield comparisons, the outdated BMP-2 has proven inferior to older Western armored personnel carriers, such as the American M113. Despite its aluminium armour, the M113 offers better manoeuvrability, troop comfort, and ease of maintenance. The BMP-2’s hull consists of multiple welded steel plates arranged at various angles, a complex structure that offers no significant protective advantage. The vehicle’s armor is just 10mm thick, which is insufficient against modern threats. In contrast, the M113’s front armor is 38mm thick, while the BMP-2’s frontal plate is only 15mm.
Moreover, in the event of an anti-tank weapon strike or mine detonation, the BMP-2’s crew and passengers are far more likely to suffer fatal consequences compared to those inside M113s—or even more so compared to the heavily armored American Bradley IFV, which has gained a strong reputation for battlefield survivability.
The BMP-2’s design is particularly ill-suited to dealing with mine threats. The left front road wheel is positioned in such a way that if the vehicle runs over a mine, the driver is almost always killed instantly.
While Soviet-era IFVs were once valued for their low production costs, Russia’s struggling economy and limited industrial capacity have hindered large-scale production of both BMP-2 and its intended successor, the BMP-3. The latter, designed as an improvement, still suffers from many fundamental flaws, which continue to drive Russian troops to prefer riding on top rather than inside.
According to the open-source intelligence website Oryx, Russia has lost 886 BMP-1, 1,471 BMP-2, and 427 modern BMP-3 IFVs, further demonstrating their vulnerability in modern warfare.
The realities of the battlefield have underscored the deficiencies of Soviet-era armoured vehicles, further highlighting the gap between ageing designs and modern combat requirements.
BMP series and its design flaws
Even Russian pro-government media outlets have begun criticizing the country’s engineers for yet another questionable technical decision regarding the BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle.
The Telegram channel Voeniy Osvedomitely, known for its ties to the Russian military, has shared photos of an upgraded BMP-3, revealing controversial modifications.
The images showcase an attempt by engineers from the Omsk Higher Tank Engineering School to equip the BMP-3 with anti-drone protection. However, this modification appears to impact the vehicle’s functionality significantly.
The troop compartment, which is designed to open upwards, is now obstructed, rendering the BMP-3 incapable of serving its intended role as an infantry fighting vehicle.
“Next to the ‘Troika,’ [BMP-3] a captured American Bradley is displayed, from which domestic designers could learn a lot—at least in terms of protection and layout,” the statement said.
The critique from even pro-Russian sources reflects growing dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of certain military adaptations. As the war continues, such engineering decisions raise questions about the actual battlefield utility of these modifications.
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