Though still a severe concern to NATO, the Russian Navy shows signs of decline reminiscent of the 1990s. Expensive reconstruction projects are struggling. Efforts to revive major warships, like the nuclear-powered battle cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, seem driven more by national pride than strategic value.
Russia has spent the last 15 years steadily modernising and rearming its navy. The work is intended to recover it from the post-Cold War low point of the 1990s, reaching new levels. The introduction of new classes of warships, though smaller than those they replace, is a significant leap in modernity. Meanwhile, new submarines, particularly the nuclear-powered Severodvinsk (Yasen) class, are world-class.
But the project now faces a major obstacle. The cracks are already showing, and Russia is unlikely to be able to maintain the modernisation of its naval forces if the war continues.
The invasion of Ukraine has heated the Russian economy and created new political and financial challenges for the Kremlin. This is felt on the battlefield and visible in the Navy’s reconstruction. So, while the future Russian navy may retain some high-end assets, particularly advanced submarines, its overall influence at sea will likely diminish.
Russia has been building new warships and submarines since the mid-2000s, accelerated in the late 2010s. The best of the Cold War vessels were selected for modernisation. At the same time, numerous new classes were laid down, and new weapons were being pioneered. Kalibr cruise missiles were rolled out to almost any vessel that could carry them, and the next-generation Zircon hypersonic missile was tested. For a time, modernising the naval capabilities was a major priority, arguably more so than the air force or army.
Russia’s ambitious submarine-building spree since the 2010s has resulted in some of the most formidable submarines in the world. Competently commanded, they present a top-tier underwater threat to NATO navies, particularly in the Atlantic. While the Russian Army got a handful of the latest T-14 Armata main battle tanks, the Navy commissioned 12 nuclear-powered submarines.
But construction was always slow, and it appeared to be getting worse. Some problems date back before the invasion, but they aren’t made any better by it. Over recent decades, Russia’s conventional submarines have fallen behind in technology.
The Lada-class has generally been seen as unsuccessful, and production is limited. In its place, the Cold War legacy Kilo-class design remains in production. This has been kept afloat by export orders and benefits from Russian cruise missiles, but in 2024, it is at least a generation behind many of the boats it is competing with. In the meantime, Chinese submarines have come from behind and leapfrogged it, not to mention the South Korean and Japanese designs.
The 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has changed everything. What is currently being invested in naval modernisation is a massive drain on resources urgently needed elsewhere. On land, Russia is already struggling with supplies of some essential equipment types, such as artillery, where attrition losses are difficult to replace. Experts forecast that this situation will become critical next year.
In the land war, some of the shortfall comprised North Korean supplies. First munitions, then ballistic missiles, then thousands of troops. Given the limited capacity to manufacture new artillery pieces, the latest development is that Russia has acquired some ‘Koksan’ heavy guns from North Korea. This demonstrates the desperation in the Russian supply chain. These mammoth artillery pieces are a non-standard 170mm, which may further strain Russian logistics. These North Korean weapons appear to be a welcome addition from the Russian perspective.
At least visibly, the first naval projects to suffer have been the modernisation of large warships. Repairs and refit to two of the largest and most impressive warships in the Russian fleet are eating up vast sums. The aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov’s refit has been delayed for years. According to an open source report, many of her crew members have been sent to the front lines in Ukraine.
The nuclear-powered Kirov-class battle cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, one of the world’s largest cruisers, is also massively delayed. The ship has been effectively non-operational since 1999, and its triumphant return to service has been repeatedly promised since 2008.
The nuclear submarine force, traditionally the most vital and most invested part of the navy, is not immune. The ‘Poseidon’ nuclear torpedo-carrying submarine Khabarovsk also appears years behind. It was laid down ten years ago and has yet to emerge from the shed.
The Russian Navy, particularly its nuclear submarines, remains a formidable threat that NATO navies take seriously. But the outlook is a return to the underinvestment and decay of the 1990s.
Efforts to get major warships back to sea, such as the carrier Admiral Kutzenov or battle cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, increasingly seem like a Pyrrhic victory. The sunk cost of these modernisations is now a question of national pride more than increasing naval capabilities. There are reports in Russian State media that the Nakhimov will sail for the first time in around 25 years this month. However, there is a significant caveat: it will sail without its nuclear reactors running. While these plans may have some practical value, they appear more for show. The Soviet practice of symbolic milestones just before year-end is alive and well.
The Russian Navy’s modernisation plans are now significantly curtailed. Russia may be hoping that the incoming government in Washington will push a favourable solution in Ukraine, but the damage to their naval plans already appears too deep.
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