The US president took the opportunity of a prime-time speech to the US public on April 1 to repeat his by now-familiar criticism of America’s Nato allies for not joining the war in Iran. He told them to “build up some delayed courage. Should have done it before. Should have done it with us as we asked.”
When President Trump told The Daily Telegraph NATO is a “paper tiger” and withdrawing the United States is “beyond reconsideration,” the foreign policy establishment erupted. It shouldn’t have. Trump was saying aloud what many inside the Pentagon have known for years. The surprise isn’t the criticism. The surprise is how long Washington waited to have this conversation.
Trump’s anger at Nato in the past fortnight has been focused on the reluctance of the likes of the UK, Germany and France to land a hand in forcing Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz. This vital waterway, through which ordinarily one-fifth of the world’s oil and gas transits, has been effectively closed by the threat from Iranian missile strikes to all but a few tankers approved by Tehran. The result has been dramatic, as energy prices have rocketed and supplies to countries dependent on Gulf oil have rapidly diminished.
The US-Israeli assault on Iran has failed to topple the regime or curtail its ability to pose a security threat in the region, leaving Tehran to wreak economic havoc. This flies in the face of the Trump administration’s claims of the overwhelming success of Operation Epic Fury. So the US president and his national security team are, at least in part, blaming Nato’s reluctance to get involved.
It’s important to stress that Article 5 of the Nato treaty mandates that Nato members must come to the aid of any fellow member which comes under attack. In the case of the US-Israeli military operation against Iran, Article 5 has not been invoked – nor does it apply. Further, many Nato members are mindful of the legacy of the disastrous war in Iraq. This sowed deep divisions within Nato after some members (notably the UK and Poland) lined up beside the US and others (France and Germany most vociferously) opposed the invasion. It also became a byword for an ill thought-out military campaign with dubious legitimacy and no exit plan.
As a result, most Nato member states are reluctant to get involved in the US-Israeli campaign against Iran. In any case, many of Nato’s European members are far more concerned about the war going on at their borders between Russia and Ukraine.
Nato reluctance has clearly stung Trump and his senior advisers. On March 31, the US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, told Fox News’s Sean Hannity that: “We’re going to have to reexamine the value of NATO and that alliance for our country. If Nato is just about us defending Europe if they’re attacked, but them denying us basing rights when we need them, that’s not a very good arrangement. That’s a hard one to stay engaged in.”
Scepticism about Nato has been growing within senior US national security ranks for some time. At various times, Rubio, vice-president, J.D. Vance, and defense secretary Pete Hegseth have all questioned how an alliance based around the principle of US-led defence of Europe against Soviet aggression now fits America’s interests.
Strait of Hormuz contention
Trump’s suggestion that allies should solve the de facto blockade in the Strait of Hormuz has added to concerns that he might be willing to end the war with Iran in control of the waterway. “What happens in the strait, we’re going to have nothing to do with,” Trump said.
Should that happen, NATO allies along with the rest of the world would face even greater economic repercussions.
Already, the slowdown in marine traffic through the waterway has caused major disruptions to the global economy with shipping companies afraid of attacks if they send their vessels through.
Oil and gas prices have gone up by up to 60 percent in some places, and some countries are facing serious shortages. Even if the waterway reopens tomorrow, the disruptions to global supply chains will be felt long after ships have been cleared to pass through the strait en masse, according to shipping and trade experts.
Highlighting those concerns, France’s Ministry of the Armed Forces said in a statement last week that Paris was in talks with about 35 countries for a mission to reopen the waterway once the war is over. The countries involved in the discussions were not named.
Key Details on NORAD Support
Approximately 4,800 personnel are involved in supporting the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), with the United States providing the vast majority of this military, logistical, and financial support compared to Canada.
Of the roughly 4,800 personnel supporting the mission, about 1,100 are Canadian, meaning the majority are American.
NORAD headquarters is located at Peterson Space Force Base in Colorado, which it shares with USNORTHCOM, and it utilizes Cheyenne Mountain.
In 2022, a $38.6 billion CAD funding commitment was announced to modernize NORAD capabilities over the next two decades.
While Canada is seeking to reduce its dependence on the U.S. due to concerns about political reliability, the two countries remain deeply intertwined in this continental defense system, which either party can terminate with 12 months’ notice.
Despite current tensions, NORAD continues to operate with significant U.S. military resources to protect the continent against aerospace and maritime threats.
Ongoing American support to Australia, Japan and South Korea
The United States provides substantial, long-term military support to Australia, Japan, and South Korea, primarily to maintain regional security in the Indo-Pacific, deter threats from North Korea and China, and ensure interoperability with U.S. forces. This support includes stationing tens of thousands of troops, providing a “nuclear umbrella” (extended deterrence), joint military exercises, and arms sales.
Japan
The U.S.-Japan alliance is a cornerstone of American strategy in Asia, with Japan increasingly acting as a “high-value node” in the U.S. security network. Hosts the largest permanent U.S. military presence in a foreign country (approx. 55,000 troops).
The U.S. supports Japan through the bilateral Security Treaty, focusing on missile defense (Aegis, Patriot systems), naval expansion, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
Japan provides significant “sympathy budget” funding, covering part of the costs of stationing U.S. troops, amounting to approximately $1.7 billion in recent agreements.
The U.S. is pushing Japan to further increase its defense budget (approaching $70 billion in 2026) and to contribute to collective defense in the first island chain.
South Korea
The U.S.-South Korea alliance is aimed at deterring North Korea and includes a combined military command structure. Hosts approximately 28,500 U.S. troops.
The U.S. maintains ~28,500 troops and provides nuclear umbrella protection.
Under a 2026 agreement, South Korea agreed to increase its cost-sharing to $1.13 billion, an 8.3% increase over the previous year, to cover local labor and logistics support.
Despite political discussions about burden-sharing, the U.S. continues to hold large-scale joint drills like “Freedom Shield” to ensure readiness.
Australia
Australia is regarded as a key ally in the southern Pacific, with ties deepening rapidly, particularly through the AUKUS agreement. Deepening integration through AUKUS, including technology sharing and submarine rotations.
The U.S. is helping Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines and facilitating increased rotational presence at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia.
The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy expects Australia to take on more responsibility, with pressure to increase its defense spending to 3.5%–5% of its GDP to support US-led deterrence.
Australia is paying a $368 billion (forecast) cost for the submarine partnership, which includes funding to support the U.S. submarine industrial base.
Trilateral Cooperation (US-Japan-South Korea)
The U.S. has encouraged a trilateral framework, strengthening “spoke-to-spoke” ties between Tokyo and Seoul to counter regional security challenges.
The three nations have signed pacts enabling deeper logistics integration, including refuelling and rearming naval vessels at sea.
Efforts are ongoing to cooperate on next-generation missile defense research and satellite-based tracking, including projects involving hypersonic missile countermeasures
Key aspects of U.S. military support to non-NATO partners
The U.S. provides substantial military support to over 19 Major Non-NATO Allies (MNNA) worldwide, including countries like South Korea, Japan, Israel, and Australia, allowing them access to specialized military training, technology, and financing without the mutual defense commitment of NATO. These nations receive expedited access to U.S. weapon systems, specialized training, and cooperative R&D efforts.
While many allies are not in NATO, the US remains the largest military spender in the world, with its defense budget in 2025 estimated to be roughly $980bn.
Major Non-NATO Ally Status (MNNA): A designation that provides foreign military financing for purchasing U.S.-made equipment, expedited weapon procurement, and preferential treatment in arms transfers.
Regional Security Focus: Support is often tailored to specific regions, such as the Middle East (Israel, Saudi Arabia) or Indo-Pacific (Japan, South Korea) to counter regional threats, rather than collective defense against a single alliance threat.
Defense Trade and Technology: Non-NATO partners are key recipients of advanced U.S. technology, such as F-35 fighter jets for Japan and Korea, and potential sales to countries like Saudi Arabia.
Security Cooperation: The U.S. engages in joint exercises and training with non-NATO allies, such as in the Indo-Pacific, to build capacity and ensure interoperability without a formal treaty obligation.
Previous NATO operations and U.S. support
Some NATO members joined the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, on the theory that the Taliban and Saddam Hussein were dangers to all Western security in the post-9/11 environment.
They followed the precedent set by America’s 1999 intervention in the distant Balkans, when it led a three-month NATO campaign to dismantle Slobodan Milosevic’s often bloody ambition to establish a Greater Serbia.
The US also joined the 2011 UN-approved, French- and British-inspired “coalition of the willing” bombing campaign in Libya.
For nearly 40 years, the US offered logistical, intelligence, reconnaissance, refueling and diplomatic support to the French in their postcolonial efforts to protect Chad from Libya and, later, Islamists.
European diffidence comes on top of Trump’s perennial effort to harangue NATO members into honoring their commitments to spend 2% of GDP on defense — especially in the case of deadbeat Spain and Canada, which for years have welched on their pledges.
Trump’s rhetoric is not what has undermined NATO.
Instead, he ripped off a happy-face scab and exposed a festering wound of increasingly anti-American hypocrisy beneath.
If you wanted to wreck the alliance, there would be no better way than to follow the duplicitous example of Western Europe’s NATO members.
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