Pakistan, Iran, Venezuela, Cambodia and Bangladesh all signed exclusive security agreements with China multiple times and enhanced military cooperation with China, but there is not a single time China sent any help to these countries when their regimes needed help.
Indo-Pak conflict, Myanmar bombed Bangladesh, Azerbaijan captured Nagorno-Karabakh, Thai-Cambodia border skirmish, and the recent Iran and Venezuela debacle for China are significant diplomatic and military embarrassments for China and Russia.
China is very quick to release a statement saying that Xi Jinping believes the conflict must be ended through dialogue. But China followed its own line on Taiwan. China never had a dialogue with Taiwan and accepted Taiwan’s independence.
What is meant by Strategic Partnership in Beijing?
The defense relationship between China and Iran is primarily defined by a long-term strategic partnership, though it often balances between high-level rhetoric and cautious material support due to international sanctions.
Signed in March 2021, the 25-Year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement is a landmark pact that forms the bedrock of their current relationship. While the full text remains undisclosed, key reported elements include:
China committed to an estimated $400 billion investment in Iran’s infrastructure (oil, gas, and telecommunications) over 25 years. In exchange for investment, China receives a steady, heavily discounted supply of Iranian oil.
The agreement explicitly outlines deeper military ties, including joint training, research, the sale of military hardware, and intelligence sharing.
Current Military and Security Cooperation
As of early 2026, the relationship has intensified following regional volatility, but remains constrained with China.
China continues to participate in annual maritime drills with Russia and Iran (such as the “Security Bond” series) to demonstrate a unified front and protect maritime trade routes.
China remains a key source for “dual-use” components and precursors for Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programs. Reports from early 2026 indicate ongoing shipments of solid-fuel precursors.
Iran, China, and Russia recently signed a new framework to coordinate on “nuclear sovereignty” and military strategy, signalling a shift toward a more formal trilateral bloc.
Strategic partnership label, no Mutual Defense.
Despite the “strategic partnership” label, there are significant friction points:
The agreements do not include formal security guarantees. During military escalations in 2025 (such as strikes on Iranian nuclear sites), China’s support remained largely rhetorical rather than material.
China frequently balances its support for Tehran with its desire to avoid secondary U.S. sanctions and maintain its broader economic interests in the West and the Arab Gulf states.
While the $400 billion figure is widely cited, actual Chinese foreign direct investment in Iran has lagged behind expectations, leading to some frustration within the Iranian leadership.
Defense cooperation, no intervention. You are alone.
Defense cooperation between China and Iran or China and Venezuela has shifted from a slow-moving strategic partnership to a more active, “oil-for-arms” relationship in light of recent regional conflicts.
While Beijing often avoids formal military alliances, it has become a critical supplier of advanced technology and a key partner in naval exercises.
Signed in 2021, the Sino-Iranian 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership serves as the foundation for their cooperation. While much of the $400 billion deal focuses on energy and infrastructure, it includes significant security provisions.
Despite these ties, China remains cautious
Beijing has signed a mutual defense pact; it treats Iran as a “strategic partner” rather than a formal ally to avoid a direct military confrontation with the U.S. or NATO.
The relationship is heavily lopsided. China is Iran’s primary economic lifeline (purchasing over 80% of its oil), while Iran is just one of several energy suppliers for China.
China continues to balance its ties with Iran against its relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, often urging de-escalation in the Strait of Hormuz to protect its own energy security.
China does not want to upset Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE by supporting Iran or regional proxies through visible weapons transfers; instead, China focuses on the shadow transfer of weapons systems, thereby making money from the deal without losing other oil suppliers.
The specific details of the $5 billion arms package
Following the “12-Day War” in June 2025 and ongoing regional tensions, Iran has looked to China to rebuild its degraded air defenses and naval capabilities.
Iran has reportedly received a $5 billion deal for Chinese CM-302 (YJ-12E) supersonic anti-ship missiles, often called “carrier killers,” and discussed purchases of DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicles.
Reports indicate the delivery of 6 HQ-16 (medium-range) and 12 HQ-17AE (short-range) surface-to-air missile batteries to reconstitute Iran’s layered defense architecture.
China has supplied 300 Sunflower-200 kamikaze drones (similar to the Shahed series) and provided roughly 80% of the components used in Iran’s domestic drone industry.
Integration of the BeiDou-3 satellite constellation for Iranian military navigation and the supply of YLC-8B anti-stealth radar systems.
Recent reports (from late February to March 2026) have shed more light on the specifics of this arms package, estimated to be worth approximately $5 billion. The deal represents a significant shift toward high-end, offensive capabilities, particularly in the maritime domain.
The centerpiece of the negotiations is the CM-302 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile (the export version of the YJ-12).
Beyond anti-ship missiles, the package is reported to include Iranian officials, who have expressed interest in Chinese HQ-19 or similar anti-ballistic missile systems to counter potential high-altitude strikes.
The deal includes the transfer of 1200 FN-6 man-portable air-defense systems (likely similar to the QW-series), providing Iranian ground forces with a more mobile defense against low-flying drones and helicopters.
These systems were destroyed on the first day of the war without any resistance from the Iranian side, as the system failed to detect any American or Israeli aircraft.
In early March 2026, intelligence reports noted Iranian ships leaving Chinese ports carrying chemicals likely intended for solid-rocket fuel production, suggesting China is also supporting Iran’s domestic missile industry infrastructure.
The “Oil-for-Arms” Mechanism
The financing of this deal is as strategic as the weapons themselves:
Given the heavy sanctions on Iran, the $5 billion package is largely being “paid for” through discounted oil exports, instead of Iran using a Barter System for an oil-for-weapon package.
In 2025, China purchased over 80% of Iran’s oil, providing the regime with the liquidity and trade credit necessary to fund these military acquisitions.
Diplomatic Deniability
Notably, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has officially denied any military cooperation with Iran to avoid secondary sanctions or a total breakdown in relations with Washington.
Recent conflict and America’s military operations against Iran confirmed that Russia has supplied Iran with the S-400 missile system, Yak-130 and Pantsir missile system, which have been destroyed on the first day of the conflict.
The contrast between the two is striking: China provides the shield, while Russia provides the sword.
Unlike China’s focus on missiles and satellites, the Russian deal is centered on manned combat aircraft. Iran has ordered 48 units of this 4-generation fighter in a deal estimated at $6.5 billion.
As of March 2026, Russia has begun phased deliveries of 12 units of Yak-130 jets.
These are currently being used in Tehran to train pilots for the more complex Su-35. Notably, an Iranian Yak-130 was reportedly shot down by an Israeli F-35 on March 4, 2026, marking a major escalation in the regional air war.
Russia has also reportedly provided S-400 batteries to protect Iranian nuclear sites, and China provided HQ-9B missiles to protect the capital city, but both systems failed to intercept a single cruise missile and a fighter jet.
Sanctions risk and economic exposure
China’s economy is deeply tied to global markets. Direct military aid to sanctioned states like Iran and Venezuela would expose Chinese banks, companies, and shipping to secondary U.S. sanctions, which Beijing wants to avoid.
China already faces sanctions pressure over technology exports to Iran; expanding into overt military aid would be far more costly.
All talks, no show for China and Russia
China avoids providing direct, overt military assistance to Venezuela and Iran because doing so would create strategic costs that outweigh the benefits. The pattern across recent reporting shows Beijing prefers economic leverage, dual‑use technology, and political alignment, not hard military commitments.
China’s leadership understands that openly arming Venezuela or Iran would trigger a major escalation with Washington, especially in regions where the U.S. has overwhelming military presence.
The U.S. has already deployed significant forces to the Caribbean in response to Venezuela’s instability, including carrier strike groups and Marines. Any Chinese military aid would be seen as a direct challenge to U.S. regional dominance.
Conclusion
Iran is useful as an energy partner and a counterweight to U.S. influence, but not worth a military entanglement. Venezuela is even less strategically important; China’s main interest there is oil and debt repayment, not military alignment.
For Bangladesh, Pakistan and Cambodia, China wants infrastructure projects through its “Belt and Road” debt diplomacy, and any weapon sale to these countries is a bonus for the Chinese third-grade military producer.
Russia is embarrassed in the Ukraine war, and China is embarrassed in the Iran war.
This fits China’s foreign policy pattern: quietly sell radars, electronics, drones, and missiles, or provide training, but avoid high‑visibility conflict to avoid exposing its military failures and maintain the deception tactics about the Chinese military prowess, not actual combat power, which has already been exposed in Pakistan, Iran and Venezuela.
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