Chinese military aircraft activity around Taiwan has dropped after Chinese military hardware failure in Iran, Venezuela and Pakistan.

Chinese military aircraft activity around Taiwan has dropped significantly as of early March 2026, with almost no incursions detected for nine out of 10 consecutive days.

Taiwan has not detected a single Chinese military aircraft around the island for nine of the past 10 days, leaving experts puzzling over the reasons for the dramatic reduction in sorties.

China claims Taiwan is part of its territory and has threatened to use force to bring the island under its control.

Beijing has stepped up military pressure on Taiwan in recent years, deploying fighter jets and warships around the island on a near-daily basis.

But since February 28, only two Chinese aircraft have been recorded in a single 24-hour period near Taiwan, according to an AFP tally of figures released daily by the defense ministry.

That compares with 86 for the same period last year. It is the longest stretch of no detections since AFP began recording the figures in 2024.

An average of six Chinese warships has been spotted around the island daily over the past 10 days, the same as last year.

Chinese military sorties around Taiwan also fell by 42 percent in January and February compared with the same period last year. The number of warships was about 4.5 percent lower than a year ago.

Experts have been speculating about the reasons for the sharp drop in Chinese aircraft deployments, with possibilities ranging from China’s annual political gathering, known as the “two sessions,” currently underway in Beijing, to its recent military purges.

Other reasons include US President Donald Trump’s scheduled trip to Beijing later this month to meet his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, and the Middle East conflict.

“I didn’t expect to be worried about the cessation of PLA operations around Taiwan, but the lack of a rational explanation is disconcerting,” Drew Thompson, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, wrote on Substack.

Another longtime observer of the Chinese military told AFP it was “not clear at all how to read it.”

“I’m puzzling over the same thing.”

Iran war effect

This sharp, rare reduction in daily sorties follows a period of high pressure, with experts suggesting causes ranging from annual political meetings to potential strategic deception or Chinese military hardware failure in Iran, Venezuela and Pakistan.

Apart from the 50 CM-302 anti-ship missiles, the Islamic Republic received Chinese 6 HQ-16B surface-to-air missile systems, 1200 FN-6 MANPADS, 300 Sunflower-200 kamikaze drones, 3 HQ-9B anti-ballistic systems, 4 YLC-9B radars, 3 Type 305A radars, 6 SLC-2 counter-battery radars, and 50 HQ-19 anti-satellite interceptor missiles, Reuters said.

At the first wave of U.S. attacks on Iran, the U.S. Air Force destroyed a stockpile of missiles in Tehran. CM-302 anti-ship missiles, HQ-16B anti-air missiles, HQ-9B anti-air missiles, SLC-2 and YLC-8B radars were completely destroyed on day 1.

Since Feb. 28, 2026, only two Chinese aircraft were recorded in a 24-hour period, a massive drop from the 86 recorded during the same period in 2025.

This is the longest period of no or near-zero detections since recording began in 2024.

   While air activity has ceased, Chinese naval vessels remain active, with an average of six ships spotted daily near the island, consistent with previous levels.

Analysts are divided on whether this is a routine pause in the Chinese “two sessions” political meetings or a tactic to lower tensions ahead of high-level meetings.

‘Significant disruption’

Ben Lewis of the analysis website PLATracker said it was “clearly a significant disruption to routine activity.”

“The longer the activity gap persists, the more concerned I will be about broader implications, but I have not seen any indications that the PRC is preparing for any major kinetic action,” Lewis told AFP.

Su Tzu-yun, a military expert at Taipei’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, surmised Beijing might be trying to “weaken public support” for Taiwan’s plans to increase its defense spending.

Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te has proposed $40 billion in extra defense spending by his government over eight years, but the plan has been met with strong resistance in the opposition-controlled parliament.

Other analysts were not surprised by the easing of aircraft activity.

“PLA air incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ drop to/near zero around the time of the annual ‘two sessions’ every year,” Brian Hart, deputy director and fellow of the China Power Project at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote on X.

“If this pattern persists well beyond the two sessions, then it would be unusual. But I don’t think there’s evidence of anything unusual yet.”

A Taiwanese security official said that Beijing may be trying to “create a false impression that China is easing its threats against Taiwan in order to deceive the US into reducing its support for Taiwan’s security.”

The United States does not have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but Washington is Taipei’s most important backer and biggest arms provider.

“We must not let our guard down,” the official said.

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