Russia faces a growing crisis over the state of its navy after prominent military analysts publicly acknowledged that the fleet is incapable of defending Russian-linked oil tankers from foreign interception.
The assessment, made by pro-Kremlin analysts and amplified by the military channel Voyennyy Osvedomitel, comes as U.S. forces continue seizing sanctioned vessels around the world.
In recent days, Russian commentators tied to the defense establishment conceded that Moscow lacks the ships, range, and logistical capacity required to conduct long-distance convoy or protection missions. Their remarks followed the U.S. seizure of the Russia-flagged crude carrier Marinera in the North Atlantic, despite the presence of Russian Navy vessels and a submarine in the broader region.
According to Voyennyy Osvedomitel, the idea that Russia could “charge with sabers drawn at American ships” to prevent tanker seizures is unrealistic. The channel stated that the Russian Navy “simply does not possess such capabilities,” noting that long-promised modernization programs have stalled and that remaining Soviet-era ships are aging without proper upgrades.
Another Russian analytical source cited by pro-Kremlin outlets offered a detailed breakdown of the fleet’s shortfalls. The analyst wrote that Russia had planned to field 44–50 new corvettes and frigates by 2020, based on early-2000s programs. Instead, the Navy received 16, including 10 corvettes whose ability “to operate actively in the North Atlantic in winter conditions is doubtful.”
Of the remaining six ships, two are currently trapped in the Black Sea, where they are blocked by the ongoing war in Ukraine and by restrictions imposed by Türkiye under the Montreux Convention.
The same source added that Russia intended to modernize approximately 20 large anti-submarine ships, destroyers, and cruisers inherited from the Soviet Union. As of today, just two have undergone meaningful upgrades: the cruiser Marshal Ustinov and the frigate Marshal Shaposhnikov.
Other Soviet-built ships remain technically afloat, but analysts said they are no longer capable of sustained operations far from home waters. The fleet’s remaining first- and second-rank vessels are enough, they argued, to maintain presence in the Baltic Sea and Barents Sea, but not to provide round-the-clock protection thousands of miles from Russian bases.
The assessment underscores the gap between Russia’s long-stated ambitions for a blue-water navy and the reality of its current ship inventory. “Even if the problem of physical presence were solved,” the analyst wrote, “there remains a major vulnerability in the legal domain,” noting that the United States is able to issue arrest warrants for tanker crews. Any civilian seafarers participating in escort missions risk detention, and Russia “cannot provide support” to foreign citizens employed on such vessels.
The analysis also referenced a December 2025 article by Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Aleksandr Moiseev, published in the journal Voennaya Mysl. In the paper, Moiseev outlined measures the Russian Navy should take to protect commercial shipping but conceded that operations outside Russia’s exclusive economic zone rely primarily on early withdrawal of ships from danger, reacting to foreign detentions, and seeking refuge in ports of friendly or neutral states.
The analyst noted that the article described the need for a comprehensive counter-drone defense system but did not address Russia’s ability to respond to a maritime blockade or escort ships in distant regions. The conclusion, widely echoed across Russian defense circles, is that “neither easy nor quick solutions exist.”
The debate comes at a moment of heightened pressure on Russia’s maritime logistics. The country has already lost most of its Black Sea Fleet combat capability due to Ukrainian strikes, while the Caspian Flotilla has suffered repeated long-range drone attacks. Russia’s Mediterranean naval presence has eroded as friendly regimes weakened and Türkiye restricted Russian naval movement.
As stated by Voyennyy Osvedomitel, the collapse of the ocean-going fleet’s credibility leaves Russia with “only paper capability.” Analysts said the Navy’s inability to shield tankers demonstrates the cumulative effect of shipbuilding failures, sanctions, and losses sustained since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
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