A mobilised Russian tank crew member fighting in Ukraine has given a candid account of the T-80BVM and T-90MS main battle tank, sharply criticising its quality, reliability, and battlefield performance.
The Russian army has lost more than 17,000 various armored platforms, including 4,500 newly built T-90S and T-90MS battle tanks, since the Ukraine invasion.
The remarks were published by the outlet Vault8 in an interview with a tanker identifying himself by the callsign “Tim.”
The T-80BVM is one of the Russian Army’s newer upgrades, publicly promoted as a modern and combat-ready tank. However, “Tim” said that the platform performs very differently under real conditions.
The T-90MS is a modernized, export-oriented version of the Russian T-90 main battle tank (MBT), developed by Uralvagonzavod and first revealed in 2011. It features significant upgrades in firepower, protection, and mobility compared to earlier T-90 and T-72BU3 variants.
He described the T-90MS and T-80BVM tank as impressive on paper but poorly built in practice.
According to him, “It is something that looks quite good on paper, but the quality of execution is terrible. The bolts are made from soft alloy, they break instantly, and you are afraid to even tighten them.”
He said critical systems fail frequently. “The hydraulics in the turret started leaking the moment the vehicle rolled off the trailer. You fix one leak and another appears. It goes on in a circle.”
The crew compartment was described as very cramped, especially for the commander, due to additional thermal imaging equipment. “The ergonomics are bad. These tanks are already tight inside, and the BVM is even tighter.”
The tanker also challenged long-standing Russian claims about the T-80’s turbine engine. While state media presents the turbine as quiet, quick-starting, and flexible in fuel use, he offered the opposite description.
“It is quiet only directly from the front. From the sides and from behind, it sounds like a jet fighter taking off.”
He also noted that in practice, crews do not use diesel: “Everyone runs it on kerosene. You cannot just fill it with diesel.”
The engine’s performance in mud was described as poor: “In our black soil, it does not move at all. It screams and whistles but barely crawls, while the T-72 drives through without a problem.”
He described a dangerous delay during combat when his unit came under mortar fire:
“When our group was spotted and they started shelling us, the T-72 started instantly and drove away. We stood under fire waiting for the turbine to spool up.”
Fuel consumption and maintenance demands were also difficult in frontline conditions. The tanker said that if leaves or debris block the air intake, the engine can shut down immediately.
He said the tank requires constant draining of fuel filters after refueling, and that cold weather starts offer no real advantage: “If the batteries are dead, the tank will not start. You cannot start it like a T-72.”
He also criticized widely seen field modifications such as heavy overhead “grill” armor and chain-based “dread” systems meant to counter drones. These, he said, severely strain transmissions and turret drives. “The load is very high. Parts wear out much faster. If the structure is mounted to the turret, the turret drives burn out.”
Dynamic protection supplies were described as severely lacking: “There is a complete shortage of proper explosive reactive armor. Some of the blocks that are installed are improvised and not equal to what was advertised.”
Despite the criticism of the T-80BVM, he expressed a clear preference for a diesel-powered platform with better reverse speed and survivability. “The ideal tank for this war is the T-90. But with a proper reverse gear.”
The tanker’s remarks provide rare firsthand detail about how Russia’s armored forces are performing under combat pressure. His account suggests that Russia continues to struggle with manufacturing quality, logistics support, and crew survivability, which directly affects its ability to sustain armored operations.
The interview reinforces assessments that Russia’s tank fleet faces structural problems that cannot be easily corrected during wartime production.
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