A new analysis says the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has played a major role in helping Iran build and sustain the supply chain behind the Shahed series of one-way attack drones, which have become a key weapon in modern asymmetric warfare.
Despite official denials, the CCP has played a central role in sustaining Iran’s Shahed-series one-way attack drones, which have proven effective in the early stages of the US-Israel strikes on Iran. Reuters reported the CCP’s plans to transfer CM-302 anti-ship missiles to Iran, which Beijing denied, but evidence shows it openly supplies critical components for the low-cost Shahed drones through multiple channels.
These drones, while not technologically advanced, excel in cost-effectiveness. India’s Takshashila Institution Indo-Pacific analyst Anushka Saxena noted in her Nikkei Asia analysis that a single Shahed unit costs an estimated $20,000–$50,000, enabling sustained attrition warfare against superior adversaries like the United States.
Iran’s Shahed Inventory and Western Components
At the outset of the conflict, Iran held an estimated 80,000 Shahed drones in stock, with daily production around 400 units.
Disassembly analyses by Ukrainian and US military technicians revealed heavy reliance on Western parts. Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence Directorate (GUR) found that in one model, up to 40 of 52 components came from 13 US companies, including Texas Instruments, NXP Semiconductors, Analog Devices, and onsemi.
A separate study of the 136-MS001 variant showed 55 of 75 components were American. Other key elements, such as GNSS modules, accelerometers, and microprocessors, originated from Switzerland, Taiwan, Japan, or China. German Infineon semiconductors, available on eBay for about $20, were also identified.
Most alarmingly, recent analyses discovered a $249 NVIDIA Jetson “Orin” AI computing kit — marketed for student use — integrated into Shahed-136 drones. This kit enables machine vision, reducing reliance on visible-light imaging.
Three Pathways of Component and Technology Transfer
Iran, one of the world’s most sanctioned nations, procures Shahed components via three main routes, with China heavily involved in each.
Shell Companies and Front Networks – US Justice Department cases highlight Iranian operatives using firms like Rah Roshd, posing as UAE and Belgian entities with forged emails (including spelling errors), to buy US servo motors and route them through China. Similar shell companies proliferated in Hong Kong and Turkey. In response, the US Treasury sanctioned 32 individuals and entities across Iran, UAE, Turkey, China, Hong Kong, India, Germany, and Ukraine.
Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) investigation identified a satellite navigation antenna in a Shahed drone labeled “Agricultural equipment parts” in both Chinese and English — a clear case of mislabeling to evade export controls.
Chinese Distributors and Re-Exporters – In February 2025, the US Treasury sanctioned six Hong Kong and Chinese firms acting as intermediaries for Iran’s Pishtazan Kavosh Gostar Boshra (PKGB). These entities procured US parts and funneled them via Chinese trading companies to Iran’s Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA) or Shahed Aviation Industries for assembly.
Direct Technology Transfers from China – Shahed-107 reportedly uses a gasoline engine from China’s Maerhao Xiang Technology Co. (DLE 111).
Shahed-131 incorporates a MDR-208 Wankel rotary engine, reverse-engineered by a Chinese firm from Britain’s AR-371.
Shahed-136’s MD-500 piston engine comes from China’s Micropilot UAV (likely derived from Germany’s Limbach via its Xiamen plant).
Russian Geran-2 (Shahed-136 variant) “E” series uses an optical camera from Chengdu Hongpu Technology Co. (TS130C-01), enabling operator-controlled operation beyond “fire-and-forget.”
Motivations Behind CCP’s Support
Saxena’s analysis outlines Beijing’s strategic calculus for openly backing Iran’s drone program.
Continuous real-world testing refines methods to bypass restrictions. Creates direct feedback loops between producers and operators; forces the US to compete with another major Iran backer, potentially shifting dynamics. China also leverages Iran’s influence in the Strait of Hormuz for its own energy security.
Gains insights into attrition and asymmetric warfare. Valuable experience against systems like Patriot missiles and THAAD radars, including combined conventional interceptors versus drone swarms. Distributed launch tactics — Shaheds fired from truck-mounted tilted rails, with mobile or underground-hidable platforms — offer models for sustained strikes on fixed air bases.
China is learning from the Iran war
China is almost certainly studying the war in Iran to assess US military capabilities and gaps – defensive and offensive – in different combat scenarios. This includes how advanced anti-missile systems like the Patriot and THAAD hold up under saturation fire and how expenditure of munitions and high-end missiles may affect its ability to sustain a prolonged conflict.
Experts told CNN this week Beijing likely has a long list of observations from the past three months in the event of future conflicts with the US, in a Taiwan-related scenario, for example. These range from evaluating command structure and asset allocation to target acquisition criteria and strike patterns. Crucially, it likely also includes ‘kill chain’ latency compression by integrating satellite intel with AI-enabled targeting protocols like the Maven Smart System.
Both scenarios suggest China is asking the same question – how do modern air wars break down an enemy and what is the most efficient – i.e., with the lowest possible human and financial costs – way to achieve that result.
Iran’s asymmetric warfare model, i.e., cheaply-made, mass-produced Shahed drones threatened to overwhelm US air defence systems in the early days of the fighting.
The fact Iran used drones and low-cost ballistic missiles to repeatedly penetrate US air cover, and target critical military and energy infrastructure, is something Beijing will have noted.
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