The Trump administration is considering a limited ground action to capture Kharg Island, which handles 90% of Iran’s oil exports near the Strait of Hormuz, following US and Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets in late February 2026.
The Pentagon is sending 2,300 Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit and 2,000 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division to the region. Iranian leaders warn of retaliation against regional allies, while US lawmakers like Rep. Nancy Mace oppose troops on the ground, citing risks of heavy casualties and an Iraq-like quagmire. Gulf states hosting US bases express concerns, and oil prices have climbed 5% amid fears of Strait disruptions.
Iran has been laying traps and moving additional military personnel and air defenses to Kharg Island in recent weeks in preparation for a possible US operation to take control of the island, according to multiple people familiar with US intelligence reporting on the issue.
The Trump administration has been weighing using US troops to seize the tiny island in the northeastern Persian Gulf — an economic lifeline for Iran that handles roughly 90% of the country’s crude exports — as leverage over the Iranians to coerce them to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, CNN has reported.
But US officials and military experts say there would be significant risks involved in such a ground operation, including a large number of US casualties. The island has layered defenses, and the Iranians have moved additional shoulder-fired, surface-to-air guided missile systems known as MANPADs there in recent weeks, the sources said.
Iran has also been laying traps including anti-personnel and anti-armor mines around the island, the sources said, including on the shoreline where US troops could possibly stage an amphibious landing if President Donald Trump moved forward with a ground operation.
U.S. Central Command released an unclassified video on Wednesday showing precision strikes on Iranian munitions storage and other sites threatening American troops and allies for decades.
The operations follow the U.S.-Iran war’s start on February 28, 2026, with hundreds of U.S. hits on missile factories and naval bases. Iran claims all U.S. regional bases destroyed, but no independent evidence supports this as American bases stay operational; meanwhile, the UAE reports intercepting thousands of Iranian drones and missiles since late February, with calls for a decisive end to Tehran’s threats.
The air campaign has struck more than 10,000 targets across Iran, including sites linked to former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) headquarters, ballistic missile facilities, drone production centres and naval assets, according to US Central Command (CENTCOM).
More than 140 Iranian vessels have been damaged or destroyed, US officials say. Iran has responded with near-daily missile and drone attacks targeting Israel, Gulf Arab states and US military bases, while effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz to most commercial shipping.
Three forces, one theatre
The reinforcements heading to the Gulf consist of three distinct formations, each with a different origin, route and timeline.
The first is the Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group, centred on the America-class assault ship USS Tripoli and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).
Ordered out of Sasebo, Japan, on March 13, the group transited the Strait of Malacca and was at Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territory by March 23. It is expected to enter the CENTCOM area by late March or early April.
The second is the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group, built around the Wasp-class assault ship USS Boxer and the 11th MEU, based in Southern California in the US.
The group departed San Diego between March 19 and March 20. Covering approximately 22,200km (13,800 miles), it is not expected to reach the combat zone around mid-April at the earliest.
The third is a contingent of about 2,000 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division’s Immediate Response Force, based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, which was the latest in line of US military reinforcements for the region.
Together, the two Marine groups would offer the US 4,500 Marines and sailors in the region. Combined with the 82nd Airborne contingent, nearly 7,000 additional troops have been deployed since the conflict began.
USS Tripoli and the 31st MEU
The USS Tripoli, an America-class amphibious assault ship, is the larger of the two Marine vessels heading to the Gulf.
Based in Sasebo alongside USS New Orleans, the group forms part of the US Navy’s forward-deployed presence in the western Pacific.
The 31st MEU, meanwhile, comprises about 2,200 Marines and sailors, built around a reinforced battalion with artillery, amphibious vehicles and specialised units.
At 261 metres (856 feet) long and weighing 45,000 tonnes, USS Tripoli can operate as a light aircraft carrier for F-35B jets while simultaneously deploying Marines by air and sea.
The 31st MEU is the Marine Corps’ only permanently forward-deployed expeditionary unit. It has previously taken part in Operation Desert Fox in 1998, patrolling off Kuwait during the Iraq weapons inspection crisis.
Operation Desert Fox was a four-day US and British bombing campaign against Iraq in December 1998, ordered by then-US President Bill Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair.
USS Boxer and the 11th MEU
The second amphibious group is centred on USS Boxer, a Wasp-class assault ship based in San Diego, California.
The Boxer Amphibious Ready Group also includes USS Comstock and USS Portland, and carries the 11th MEU, based at Camp Pendleton, in California.
USS Boxer departed San Diego on March 19, and according to the US authorities, the deployment was accelerated by approximately three weeks from its originally scheduled date.
At a distance of approximately 22,200km (13,800 miles) from the Gulf of Oman, the group is at least three weeks from the theatre and is not expected before mid-April.
Like USS Tripoli, USS Boxer can deploy F-35B aircraft along with helicopters and other support platforms.
The 11th MEU includes about 2,200 Marines and sailors, alongside roughly 2,000 additional sailors across the three ships.
The unit has an extensive combat record in the Gulf. In 1990–91, it formed part of an amphibious deception plan that tied down Iraqi forces along the Kuwaiti coast.
That campaign followed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and involved a coalition of more than 700,000 troops from 35 countries.
In August 2004, the 11th MEU led operations in Iraq’s Najaf province and remained there until February 2005.
82nd Airborne Division
The 82nd Airborne Division, based at Fort Bragg, serves as the core of the US Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps.
Approximately 2,000 troops from its Immediate Response Force have now been ordered to the Middle East.
This brigade-sized formation of about 3,000 soldiers can deploy anywhere in the world within 18 hours.
The 82nd is the Army’s primary forced-entry unit, trained to conduct parachute assaults, seize airfields and secure terrain for follow-on forces. However, it deploys without heavy armour in the initial phase, limiting its ability to hold territory against counterattacks.
The division has a long combat history, including operations in Normandy and the Netherlands during World War II.
More recently, it has been deployed to the Gulf War in 1991, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. It was also mobilised to the Middle East in January 2020 following the US killing of Qassem Soleimani, a senior IRGC commander.
What could these forces do?
The build-up has focused attention on a narrow set of potential missions rather than any sort of ground campaign, experts say.
Ruben Stewart, senior fellow for land warfare at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), told Al Jazeera that a ground campaign is not likely at this point.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq required around 160,000 troops for a country that is a quarter the size of Iran, he noted, while the combat force currently deploying, not including supporting troops, consists of two battalions of US Marines and two battalions of paratroopers, each of which are about 800 in number – a total of around 3,600.
“The force being deployed is consistent with discrete, time-limited operations, not a sustained ground campaign. Both are rapid-response, modular forces designed for raids, seizures of key terrain, and short-duration missions with limited follow-on presence,” Stewart said.
He also noted: “What is notably absent are the heavy armoured units, logistics depth, and command structures required for a prolonged land war. In practical terms, this is a force that can act quickly and selectively, but not one that could sustain operations deep inside Iran or over an extended period.”
While no ground operation has been ordered, the scale and composition of forces, combined with public statements from US officials, suggest at least three scenarios may be under consideration.
These include seizing or blockading Kharg Island, clearing Iran’s coastline to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and, in the most consequential scenario, securing Iran’s nuclear material.
Kharg Island, a five-mile (8km) coral outcrop approximately 26km (16 miles) off Iran’s southwestern coast, handles an estimated 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports. US air strikes earlier this month damaged military infrastructure there, including its airfield.
Beyond Kharg, US Marine forces could carry out helicopter-borne raids against Iranian missile sites, mine stockpiles and fast-attack craft along the Strait of Hormuz.
Of the three options, securing the Strait of Hormuz is the most realistic operational scenario, Stewart said.
This would likely take the form of “limited action along the Strait of Hormuz such as securing key maritime terrain or suppressing threats to shipping. That aligns with the capabilities of amphibious and airborne forces operating from sea and regional bases,” he said.
Seizing Kharg Island is technically feasible but more escalatory, he added, given its centrality to Iran’s oil exports. “By contrast, securing Iran’s nuclear material would be the least realistic with this force as it would require a far larger, sustained ground presence,” Stewart said.
Overall, “the highest escalation risk comes from strikes on strategic infrastructure like Kharg Island or nuclear sites, which would likely trigger a broader Iranian response,” he said. “More broadly, as additional US forces are drawn into the Middle East, there is a risk that other actors exploit reduced US presence or attention elsewhere, so escalation dynamics need to be assessed globally, not just within the immediate theatre.”
Rubio’s remarks about securing nuclear material have also raised the prospect of operations targeting Iran’s key facilities, including Natanz, Fordow, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre. These sites have already been struck from the air.
Retired Admiral James Stavridis, former NATO supreme allied commander, warned in a recent Bloomberg opinion piece that any assault on Kharg Island would face “massive drone attacks, small boats loaded with explosives, and missiles” during transit through the strait.
He added that Iranian forces on the island could be “easily overcome by the first waves of US forces”, but cautioned that it could be heavily booby-trapped.
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