A prominent Russian military analyst says Russia continues to face major technical obstacles in developing and fielding an effective active protection system (APS) for its armored vehicles, despite decades of effort and the growing use of drones on the battlefield.
In a detailed technical commentary, Russian defence expert Viktor Murakhovsky described ongoing difficulties with the Arena-M APS program, which state media and defence officials have repeatedly presented as a key solution to protecting tanks and infantry fighting vehicles from anti-tank weapons and loitering munitions.
The Arena-M system has several key components that work together to provide adequate protection, including radar and control systems, countermeasure launchers, and specialised munitions. Arena-M APS’s key components are imported from Israel, Taiwan and South Korea.
Murakhovsky’s commentary suggests that, despite ongoing work on Arena-M, core radar detection and software challenges remain unresolved, thereby delaying the widespread deployment of an APS system that Russia has promoted for years.
Since Russia lacks the industrial capability to manufacture electronics and is currently under international sanctions, it cannot manufacture a reliable active protection system without foreign parts.
The most recent stage of development aimed to expand the range of targets that the system cannot detect and defeat, including small UAVs, ATGM, projectiles, and FPV-type strike drones. However, according to Murakhovsky, engineers encountered a fundamental problem in the system’s radar performance.
Murakhovsky noted that the radar struggles to detect and classify small, low-visibility targets, including mini and micro drones made from radio-transparent materials such as plastic. He wrote that on the current known level of Russian radar technology, such detection capabilities “have not been achieved.”
The system was intended to automatically detect threats and neutralize them moments before impact.
However, Murakhovsky stated that the radar’s inability to separate airborne objects from ground clutter at short distances remains a critical limitation. The algorithms used for target detection, tracking, and prioritization, he said, are still not developed enough to handle drones that move unpredictably and at low speed.
According to Murakhovsky, methods traditionally used in air-defense radars — including Doppler detection and moving target indication — are ineffective against UAVs with a very small radar cross-section and low velocity, particularly when they operate close to terrain features or at very low altitude.
He wrote that the necessary algorithmic solutions “have not yet been created.”
Arena-M and its earlier variants have been under development in different forms since the late Soviet period. While Russia has showcased the system repeatedly and announced plans for large-scale deployment, serial integration into frontline units has not taken place.
On the battlefield, Russian forces have instead relied heavily on improvised physical screens, welded cage structures, and field-made counter-drone armor to reduce drone impact damage. These adaptations highlight the gap between Russian industrial capability and operational demand.
Murakhovsky’s assessment suggests that the Russian defense industry faces increasing pressure as drone warfare accelerates. Modern combat now requires rapid, automated active defenses, not just heavier armor. If these gaps persist, armored units may continue experiencing high attrition in environments where cheap drones can reliably strike vehicles from multiple angles.
© 2025, GDC. © GDC and www.globaldefensecorp.com. Unauthorized use and/or duplication of this material without express and written permission from this site’s author and/or owner is strictly prohibited. Excerpts and links may be used, provided that full and clear credit is given to www.globaldefensecorp.com with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.
